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Non-technical summary 
 
From a competition policy perspective, predatory behaviour (‘predation’) has always been a 
rather controversial issue. For example, while some commentators doubt that such forms of 
behaviour play a significant role in real markets, others argue that predation can very well be 
a rational strategy for incumbents facing an entry threat. In addition to the discussions on the 
rationality of predation, researchers and practitioners were involved in controversial 
exchanges on the question how predation should be detected in actual competition cases. This 
strand of research concentrated on the derivation of suitable cost concepts on the one hand, 
and the design of entire investigation frameworks on the other hand. 
 Given the detailed discussions on the rationality and detection of predation, it comes as a 
surprise that the existing literature largely ignores the complementary final step in an antitrust 
investigation, namely the question how to intervene against detected predators. This lack of 
research is unfortunate for especially two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, the 
key aim of an efficient implementation of a deterrence-based antitrust policy can only be 
reached by sending out clear signals to possible predators about the legal consequences of 
such misconduct. Second, from a practical perspective, the witnessed significant increase in 
successful predation cases in the European Union immediately raise the question how 
competition authorities and courts should intervene against (detected) predators.  
 Against this background, the paper commences with a brief characterisation of the building 
blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluates selected 
enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no 
rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post 
approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the 
preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht sind die Meinungen zu den verschiedenen Formen 
marktverdrängender wettbewerbsaverser Verhaltensweisen (sog. ‚Predation‘) schon immer 
kontrovers gewesen. So zweifeln manche Kommentatoren an, dass solche Verhaltensweisen 
in realen Märkten überhaupt eine signifikante Bedeutung zukommt, während andere 
argumentieren, dass Predation sehr wohl eine rationale Strategie für alteingesessene 
Unternehmen sein kann, die sich Markteintritten konfrontiert sehen. Zusätzlich zu diesen 
Diskussionen über die Rationalität von Predation waren sowohl Wissenschaftler als auch 
Praktiker in kontroverse Diskussionen im Bezug auf die Frage involviert, wie Predation in 
realen Wettbewerbsfällen aufgedeckt werden soll. Dieser Forschungsschwerpunkt 
konzentrierte sich einerseits auf die Ableitung geeigneter Kostenkonzepte sowie andererseits 
die Ausgestaltung ganzheitlicher Untersuchungsschemata.  
 Angesichts dieser detaillierten Diskussionen zur Rationalität und Aufdeckung von 
Predation-Strategien ist es überraschend festzustellen, dass die bestehende Literatur den 
komplementären letzten Schritt in der wettbewerbspolitischen Untersuchungsabfolge 
weitgehend ignoriert, nämlich die Frage, wie man gegen Unternehmen vorgehen soll, die der 
Anwendung einer Predation-Strategie überführt wurden. Diese Forschungslücke muss aus 
zwei Gründen heraus als unglücklich angesehen werden. Einerseits kann aus theoretischer 
Sicht nur dann eine effiziente Implementierung einer abschreckungsbasierten 
Wettbewerbspolitik erreicht werden, wenn klare Signale an die Unternehmen ausgesendet 
werden, welche rechtlichen Folgen ein entsprechendes Fehlverhalten hat. Anderseits kann aus 
praktischer Sicht festgestellt werden, dass in der jüngeren Vergangenheit ein signifikanter 
Anstieg in der Zahl erfolgreicher Predation-Fälle in der Europäischen Union zu verzeichnen 
war und somit die Frage aufgeworfen wird, wie Wettbewerbsbehörden und Gerichte mit 
überführten Unternehmen umgehen sollen.  
 Vor diesem Hintergrund beginnt der Beitrag mit einer kurzen Charakterisierung der 
wesentlichen Bestandteile eines wettbewerbspolitischen Untersuchungsschemas für Predation 
um in der Folge dann ausgewählte Möglichkeiten der Verfolgung solcher untersagten 
Verhaltensweisen wohlfahrtsökonomisch zu evaluieren und zwar mit Hilfe eines Duopol-
Predation Modells à la Cournot. Basierend auf einer Unterscheidung in einen ‚no rule‘ 
Ansatz, einen ‚ex ante‘ Ansatz sowie zwei ‚ex post‘ Ansätze wird gezeigt, dass ein ex post 
Ansatz typischerweise die Gesamtwohlfahrt maximiert. Ein ‚ex ante‘ Ansatz kann aber dann 
die beste Wahl sein, wenn das eintretende Unternehmen einen großen Kostenvorteil im 
Vergleich zum alteingesessenen Unternehmen aufweist.      
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1. Introduction 
Predatory behaviour typically occurs in two phases: a predation phase and a recoupment 
phase. In the predation phase, the predator tenders a product that offers ‘too much value’ to 
consumers (e.g., the price is too low, the quality is too high, or the product is too innovative) 
and thus weakens rivals. In the recoupment phase, the predator takes advantage of the 
weakened rival and reduces the consumer value of its products to a level below the 
competitive one. 
 From a competition policy perspective, predatory behaviour (‘predation’) has always been 
a rather controversial issue. For example, while some commentators doubt that such forms of 
behaviour play a significant role in real markets, others argue that predation can very well be 
a rational strategy for incumbents facing an entry threat. In addition to the discussions on the 
rationality of predation, researchers and practitioners were involved in controversial 
exchanges on the question how predation should be detected in actual competition cases. This 
strand of research concentrated on the derivation of suitable cost concepts on the one hand, 
and the design of entire investigation frameworks on the other hand. 
 Given the detailed discussions on the rationality and detection of predation, it comes as a 
surprise that the existing literature largely ignores the complementary final step in an antitrust 
investigation, namely the question how to intervene against detected predators. This lack of 
research is unfortunate for especially two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, the 
key aim of an efficient implementation of a deterrence-based antitrust policy can only be 
reached by sending out clear signals to possible predators about the legal consequences of 
such misconduct. Second, from a practical perspective, the witnessed significant increase in 
successful predation cases in the European Union such as Napp1 (UK, 2001), Lufthansa2 
(GER, 2002), Wanadoo3 (EU, 2003) and Aberdeen Journal4 (UK, 2004) immediately raise the 
question how competition authorities and courts should intervene against (detected) predators.  
 Against this background, the paper commences with a brief characterisation of the building 
blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluates selected 
enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no 
rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post 
approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the 
preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.   
2. Building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules 
In this section, the building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules are briefly 
characterized in order to allow an economic evaluation of selected enforcement options in the 
preceding section. The construction of the framework largely follows Hüschelrath and 
Weigand (2010).   
2.1. Characterising predation 
A fairly large number of definitions of predation exist. Cabral and Riordan (1997: 160), for 
example, define an action as ‘predatory’ if “a different action would increase the likelihood 
that rivals remain viable and … the different action would be more profitable under the 
counterfactual hypothesis that the rival’s viability were unaffected.“ According to Farrell and 
Katz (2001: 2), predatory behaviour can be schematically thought of as occurring in two 
                                                          
1  Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd. and Subsidiaries v. Director General of Fair Trading, CA98/2/2001 
(2001).  
2  Beschluss in dem Verwaltungsverfahren gegen Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Köln, B 9-144/01 (2002).  
3  COMP/38.233 - Wanadoo Interactive (2003). 
4  Predation by Aberdeen Journal Ltd., CA98/5/2001 (2002). 
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phases: a predation phase and a recoupment phase. In the first phase, the predator tenders a 
product that offers ‘too much value’ to consumers (e.g., the price is too low, the quality is too 
high, or the product is too innovative) and thus weakens rivals. In the second phase, the 
recoupment phase, the predator takes advantage of the weakened rival and reduces the 
consumer value of its products to a level below the competitive one.  
Based on this initial characterisation, the general business concept of a predation strategy 
can be clarified by analysing the profits of the incumbent over time. Initially, a market in 
which a single incumbent sets the profit-maximising (monopoly) price is assumed. The 
incumbent gains a so-called excess profit, which is defined as the difference between the 
monopoly profit  Mono and the duopoly profit  Duo. At point tentry, a rival firm enters the 
market. If the incumbent accommodates the rival in the market, both firms would realise  
 Duo. In a Cournot equilibrium, the profits of both firms are assumed to be positive but of 
different size as long as both firms are not symmetrical in terms of their cost structures and 
production capacities. If the incumbent accommodates the entrant, it would lose its excess 
profit.  
Besides entry accommodation, the incumbent might think about the possibility of lowering 
the price, raising the quality, etc., by such an amount that the entrant makes losses and is 
forced to exit the market at point texit. Although the incumbent has to sacrifice profits during 
the predation period, he might regain its old monopoly position and the corresponding 
monopoly profit  Mono until the market ends or another rival firm enters the market. Based on 
this simple set-up, the profitability of the predation investment depends on especially five 
factors: (1) the level of losses in the predation period ( Duo -  Pred); (2) the level of excess 
profits after the exit of the entrant ( Mono -  Duo); (3) the number of predation periods ; (4) 
the number of periods after the exit of the entrant  and (5) the discounting factor of future 
profits .  
Recent economic research has focused mainly on factors (2) and (4), namely assessing 
ways by which the predator can recoup its losses sacrificed in the predation period. The most 
straightforward answer is that it can achieve changes in market structure by forcing exit so 
that it can regain excess profits and strengthen its dominant market position. Another channel 
to reach the necessary recoupment are changes in the nature of competition; for example, the 
predator obtains a tough reputation and can deter future entry in the same or adjacent markets. 
A third possibility to recoup the losses of the predation period are changes in the nature of 
demand, for example, by (additional) consumers switching from the market-leaving entrant to 
the predator (see Frontier Economics, 2002).  
2.2. Rationalising predation 
Based on the characterisation of predation, deriving the two basic conditions for rational 
predation is straightforward. First, the use of such a strategy must expect a positive net 
present value of the investment, meaning that the benefits gained in period two must exceed 
the cost stemming from period one (effectiveness condition). Second, in the decision situation 
at hand there must be no superior alternative strategy, meaning that no strategy is available 
which could reach the same profit level with less cost burden or a higher profit level with the 
same cost burden (efficiency condition). If one of the two conditions is not fulfilled, predation 
becomes an irrational strategy and the observed price reductions must be explained 
differently. 
Focusing on the efficiency question first, one frequently cited argument for the irrationality 
of predation strategies is that in any situation in which predation would be profitable, it is not 
profit-maximising for a long-run profit-maximising firm. Without trying to prove the 
theoretical correctness of this proposition (which appears to be challenging at least in a multi-
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market context), it is obviously based on the presumption that acquisition, collusion or 
accommodation are suitable and reachable strategic answers to market entry for an incumbent. 
With respect to mergers and acquisitions it is obvious that such a presumption is critical as 
soon as some kind of merger control procedure is implemented. Such investigations would 
foreclose (or at least endanger) the success of strategic mergers, especially in cases where 
aggressive maverick firms are the target. Collusion as an alternative strategy is often 
confronted with severe agreement and stability problems; and accommodating might 
generally be a dangerous strategy in the long run, especially if the entrant is more efficient 
than the incumbent. Moreover, colluding and accommodating can hardly be suitable general 
strategies for an incumbent in response to entry, as such conduct would reduce the entry risk 
of potential entrants and therefore would create some kind of ‘reputation for faintness’. 
Consequently, even in the case that other strategies are more efficient in a certain situation, 
predation can be some kind of second-best way of maintaining a monopoly position.  
The effectiveness question is the general focus of most research on predation and produced 
a multitude of arguments in favour of or against its rationality. Starting with the simple 
delineation of predation in two periods, the arguments of the opponents are based on two 
simple, interrelated aspects. First, the incumbent’s losses in the first period are severe because 
of its high market share. Second, the expected gains in the second period are low, in fact, too 
low to outweigh the severe losses realised in the first period. Some scholars find it 
implausible, for instance, that the predator can foreclose the market effectively for new 
entrants in the post-predation period, especially if new entrants can buy the equipment of the 
market-leaving prey. A further argument states that investors have a profit-driven incentive to 
help efficient victims with credits to survive the predation period. As a rational predator can 
foresee this, the predation strategy becomes unprofitable and therefore irrational.   
It is the merit of game-theoretic research to have investigated the correctness of such 
arguments in a rigid analytical framework. The fundamental results show that predatory 
actions could indeed be optimal strategies in a world of incomplete or asymmetric 
information. The so-called models of financial market predation address the question of why 
investors should not have an incentive to help efficient victims to survive the predation 
period. One answer is that, due to information asymmetries in efficient capital markets, 
investors do not know exactly the efficiency of the entrant and the entrant has incentives to 
covey a “misleading optimistic impression of its ability to survive” (Martin, 1994: 461). 
Given this incomplete information combined with opportunism, investors will not provide 
capital or at best a risk premium which increases the costs of the entrant.  
The signalling and reputation models both consider low prices as instruments of the 
incumbent to mislead the (less informed) entrant into believing that market conditions are 
unfavourable for entry. One type of signalling models argues that a low price could (under 
certain conditions) be interpreted as a signal for the efficiency of the incumbent (e.g., if the 
entrant believes that the incumbent’s low prices reflect low costs). The reputation models 
focus on the rationality of a price reduction in one market by means of establishing a 
reputation as a tough price cutter in other markets (see Bolton et al., 2000: 2299ff.). This 
reputation might induce the entrant to retreat from entering the same or an alternative market 
in which the incumbent is active.    
2.3. Enforcing predation 
In general, the enforcement of anti-predation rules can be divided into two subsequent stages. 
The detection stage focuses on how predation should be revealed (and especially 
distinguished from procompetitive price decreases), while the intervention stage addresses the 
complementary question of what should be done with firms who applied predation strategies.  
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2.3.1. Detecting predation  
The key finding thus far is that predation can be a rational business strategy. Under the 
assumption that it typically has negative implications on overall welfare and particularly 
consumer welfare, the question of how to detect predation in real antitrust cases becomes the 
crucial next step in the antitrust analysis of predation. Technically, detecting predation 
basically means that the antitrust authority has to investigate whether the prices of an 
incumbent are unreasonably low, solely aiming at swamping the entrant out of the market.  
Given this basic aim, the usage of an (ex post) per se rule (as an objective indicator) seems 
to be the obvious antitrust reaction. If the price set by the incumbent is below some measure 
of cost, it is defined as predatory otherwise it is not. Consistently with this basic 
argumentation, in 1975, Areeda and Turner (1975: 697ff.) proposed a pure cost-based rule to 
define and detect predatory pricing in antitrust cases. Under this approach, a price at or above 
the defendant’s average variable cost (applied as a surrogate for short-run marginal cost) is 
conclusively deemed lawful and a price below the defendant’s average variable cost is 
conclusively deemed unlawful, as a profit-maximising firm would never charge such a price. 
Following an extensive use of the Areeda-Turner rule in the first years after its invention, 
the identification of substantial practical drawbacks (such as its static character and its error-
proneness) led to the disappearance of the respective application enthusiasm. In the aftermath, 
research in antitrust law and economics has focused on especially three major areas to 
improve the detection of predation strategies. First, considerable effort has been undertaken to 
develop superior rules which try to avoid several problems of the Areeda-Turner rule (see 
Brodley and Hay, 1981: 738ff.). Williamson (1977: 284ff.), for instance, invented an (ex ante) 
‘no post-entry output increase’ rule in 1977, followed by Baumol’s (ex ante) ‘no post-exit 
price increase’ rule two years later (see Baumol, 1979).  
Second, more appropriate cost concepts for predation cases have been developed. The most 
influential proposals of this strand of research are the concept of average avoidable cost by 
Baumol (1996: 58ff.) and the average incremental cost standard defined by Bolton, Brodley 
and Riordan (2000), which both address the problem in practical predation cases to 
distinguish between the various cost test in a multi-product firm context.  
Third, an (ex post) two-step standard for the detection of predation strategies was 
developed as an amendment to the compulsory price-cost comparisons. The basic idea of the 
standard is that before time-consuming cost calculations are undertaken, the general 
probabilities of future supra-competitive pricing and recovery of losses by the predator should 
be considered first to get a rough estimate whether predation could generally be a problem in 
the market at hand. This proposal was basically motivated by a decision-theoretic framework 
proposed by Joskow and Klevorick (1979: 218), in which the authors favour a policy “that 
would minimise the sum of the expected costs of error and the costs of implementation”. The 
cost of error can be classified, as in statistical terminology, as type I and type II errors. A type 
I error would be an erroneous condemnation of procompetitive behaviour, while the failure to 
condemn an instance of anticompetitive behaviour would be a type II error.    
Recent research has focused mainly on the extension of the two-step standard to a complete 
(ex post) rule of reason approach, which especially tries to integrate the fundamental game-
theoretic insights as well as the new cost concepts sketched above. Current research 
competition between different frameworks is tough (see, e.g., Bolton et al., 2000, and 
Mastromanolis, 1998) and becomes increasingly differentiated, as special industries and 
special industry characteristics (such as network effects) become the focal point of interest 
(see Oster and Strong, 2001, or Kate and Niels, 2004). Probably the most influential general 
attempt to construct a full rule of reason approach is the four stages framework of Bolton et 
al. (2000: 2262ff.). The authors recommend starting case work with an examination of the 
general market conditions in order to sort out unlikely predation cases, such as those in which 
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the defendant does not have market power, no significant entry barriers are present or the 
respective entrant is strong. The second stage looks for a general scheme of predation and 
supporting empirical evidence, followed by an assessment of the probability of recoupment in 
stage three. Subsequently, in stage four, prices and costs are examined, taking the ‘average 
incremental cost’ standard into account. The framework is amended by a so-called efficiency 
defense, which aims at “eliminating cases where below-cost pricing by a firm with market 
power is likely to be welfare-enhancing, rather than predatory. In these cases, the sacrifice of 
present profits through low pricing is justified for reasons other than exclusion or disciplining 
of rivals” (Bolton et al., 2000: 2274). Examples of such reasons include product promotions, 
penetration pricing in network industries, learning by doing, pricing in systems markets, 
monopoly with complementary products, irreversible exit, industry rationalisation, 
encouraging additional infra-marginal sales and disposal of excess or obsolete stock (see 
Edwards, 2002: 183ff., for a detailed description).  
2.3.2. Intervening against predation 
Detecting is a necessary but not sufficient condition for enforcing. Even the cleverest 
detection rule remains an academic mind game if it is not applied in the sense that possible 
infringements are not pursued and possibly punished. As seen in the preceding section, the 
antitrust authority has the choice between two basic control strategies to ensure respect for 
legal prohibitions: a per se rule or a rule of reason analysis. It can further choose among two 
alternatives with respect to the timing of control: ex ante and ex post.  
When it comes to intervening against detected behaviour the antitrust authority gains a third 
decision variable, namely the type of intervention. In general, three types of interventions are 
available: fines, behavioural remedies and structural remedies. A fine is commonly 
understood as imprisonment or an amount of money which must be paid for a proved 
misdemeanour or felony; a remedy comprises all other possible non-pecuniary interventions 
with either a behavioural or a structural focus. Conceptually, fines and remedies differ 
considerably, as “[r]emedies cure, correct, or prevent unlawful conduct, whereas sanctions 
penalise or punish it” (OECD, 2007: 7).  
Given this broad delineation of general enforcement actions, the remainder of this paper 
will concentrate on the four options which are most likely to become implemented in actual 
competition policy: a no rule approach, two ex post rule of reason approaches and an ex ante 
per se rule approach. Figure 1 exemplarily sketches the consumer surplus effects of the four 
enforcement options which will be characterised in greater detail in the following sections.   
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Figure 1: Consumer surplus effects of different enforcement options 
 
2.3.2.1. No rule approach 
In a no rule approach, the antitrust authority on principle does not encroach upon any event of 
unreasonably low prices. Consequently, the incumbent is able to implement its predation 
strategy and swamps out the rival at point texit. The consumers can enjoy the additional high 
consumer surplus during the predation period but are condemned, after the forced exit of the 
rival, to the high monopoly price and the correspondingly low consumer surplus until the 
market ends or another firm enters the market at point tend.  
The overall welfare effect of a predation strategy under a no rule approach can be derived 
by adding up the three welfare components: consumer surplus, producer surplus of the 
incumbent and producer surplus of the entrant. If the predation attempt of the incumbent is 
successful, it is shown in Annex 5.1 that the net overall welfare would still increase – 
compared to a continuation of the monopoly situation – as long as 
 edPrIedPrEMonoIMonoedPr CSCS  . (1)
Inequality (1) basically says that the consumer surplus gain in the predation period has to be 
larger than the loss in producer surplus in the same period to increase overall welfare. As 
predation is assumed to be successful, the market performance in the post-predation period is 
the same as in a ‘continuous monopoly’ counterfactual scenario and therefore of no relevance 
for calculating the net welfare effect.  
In an alternative scenario, it is assumed that predation is unsuccessful for the incumbent 
because the entrant somehow survives the predation period. Comparing such a situation with 
the realised welfare in the scenario of successful predation, it is shown in Annex 5.2 that the 
net welfare increases as long as  
 DuoIDuoEMonoIMonoDuo CSCS  . (2)
Inequality (2) says that the consumer surplus gain due to increased competition (in the post-
predation period) must be larger than the loss in producer surplus due to competition (in the 
post-predation period) in order to realise a net increase in overall welfare. Due to the 
deadweight loss caused by monopoly prices, this condition typically holds, and the welfare 
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gain increases with the spread between the pre-predation price level and the price level which 
would exist under perfect competition. However, there are situations – such as the so-called 
natural monopoly – in which the derived inequality would not hold. 
 
2.3.2.2. Ex post rule of reason 
Under an ex post approach, the antitrust authority’s aim is to take appropriate action against 
predation strategies during or after the infringement occurred. Depending on intervention 
timing, an ex post I approach and an ex post II approach can be distinguished. Under the 
former, the antitrust authority ends the infringement before the entrant is forced to leave the 
market (at point int1t ).5 In such a case, the consumers are able to enjoy a period of low prices 
before the intervention and still get the duopoly price and the corresponding duopoly 
consumer surplus after the intervention of the antitrust authority until the market ends. In 
terms of overall welfare, inequality (2) above has already defined the condition under which 
an ex post I approach is superior to a no rule approach. Under the ex post II approach, the 
antitrust authority intervenes after the prey already left the market (at point int2t ). In such a 
situation, the antitrust authority cannot force the incumbent to set the duopoly price and the 
consumers would only realise the small monopoly consumer surplus in the post-predation 
period. However – as part of an ex post II approach – the antitrust authority normally imposes 
a fine for the proved misdemeanour or felony.  
The economically appropriate way to fix the level of such a fine is the subject of ongoing 
discussions among antitrust scholars. Simply the aim of setting antitrust fines is one hotbed of 
dispute. While some scholars see fines as an important instrument in the prevention of 
violations (i.e., the creation of a deterrence effect), others understand fines more as reparation 
of the harm caused by the misdemeanour or felony (see Wils, 2002: 10ff., for a detailed 
discussion). Although both concepts do not necessarily fall foul with each other, it is shown 
below that both concepts can lead to quite different fine levels.   
With respect to the ex post II approach in predation enforcement, a deterrence effect would 
not be reached as long as the fine simply reduces but not matches the expected (net) excess 
profits of the incumbent (ex post II (no fine) approach). However, if the antitrust authority can 
credibly commit ex ante to imposing a fine which takes away that (net) excess profit of  
   DuoIedPrIDuoIMonoIbasedGainF   (3)
such an approach would realise the same overall consumer surplus as the ex ante approach 
sketched below (see Annexes 5.3 and 5.5 for the proofs). This is simply because the 
incumbent would anticipate before applying the predation strategy that it will get caught and 
that the fine would take away the excess profit.  
Although such a gain-based fine looks justified and attractive in the first place, theoretical 
research in law and economics has shown that so-called harm-based ‘optimal’ fines have 
under fairly general assumptions certain advantages over gain-based fines (see Wils, 2002: 
22ff.). In situations, for instance, in which certain forms of behaviour harm the society less 
than it brings the offender, the offender would still commit the offence (and pay the fine). In 
such an environment, gain-based fines would lead to over-deterrence, as they would prevent 
such ‘efficient’ offences.6 Additionally, gain-based fines might also lead to a problem of 
under-deterrence, which is caused when errors in the estimation of harm/gain occur. 
                                                          
5 The graph in Figure 1 shows that the realised consumer surplus depends on the exact enforcement timing of 
the antitrust authority. In order to maximise consumer surplus, it would be optimal to hold back the 
intervention to the point at which the entrant has to leave the market. 
6  This argument is based on the general work of Becker (1968: 169ff.), who shows that even if the 
enforcement costs are zero, it is not economically justified to deter all violations, as some offences are 
efficient in the sense that the gain to the offender exceeds the harm to the victim.  
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Underestimating the gain would lead to a complete loss of the deterrence effect as the 
offender would still make a profit while underestimating the harm could still hold up the 
deterrence effect (as the fine might still be higher than the gain).  
Although harm-based fines might indeed have certain advantages over gain-based fines, it 
is not straightforward how harm should be defined. A frequently used definition for deterring 
antitrust violations was derived by William Landes (1983: 652ff.) based on the general work 
of Gary S. Becker (1968). Landes shows that the “optimal penalty should equal the net harm 
to persons other than the offender” (Landes, 1983: 678).7 In the context of predation, the 
optimal harm-based fine is given by the following expression (see Annex 5.3 for the proof)8: 
       DuoEMonoDuoedPrEDuoEedPrDuobasedHarm CSCSCSCSF  . (4)
In the predation period α, net harm to others is given by the sum of the difference between 
the duopoly and predation consumer surplus (harm to consumers) and the difference between 
the entrant’s duopoly and predation profits (harm to other producers). If predation is 
successful, the net harm to others in the post-predation period β is given by the difference 
between the duopoly and the monopoly consumer surplus and the entrant’s duopoly profits it 
would have earned without a successful predation strategy. The overall net harm to others 
shown above is just the sum of the two expressions. 
This definition of a harm-based fine allows deriving the welfare differential between an ex 
post I and an ex post II approach. Both approaches realise the same welfare in the predation 
period. In the post-predation period, however, the approaches differ. The ex post I approach 
guarantees the duopoly welfare for the whole post-predation period β, which is given by the 
expression  DuoIDuoEDuoCS  . The welfare realised with an ex post II approach is the sum of 
the monopoly welfare realised during the whole post-predation period  MonoIMonoCS   and the 
harm-based fine imposed by the antitrust authority, ε periods after the end of the predation 
period (with 0 ; see Annex 5.4 for the proof)     
  DuoEMonoDuo
edPr
E
Duo
E
edPrDuo
IIpostEx
CSCS
CSCSW


. (5)
Overall, an ex post I approach is superior to an ex post II approach as long as the following 
inequality holds 
   DuoIDuoEDuoCS    MonoIMonoCS           DuoEMonoDuoedPrEDuoEedPrDuo CSCSCSCS  . (6)
Rearranging both sides leads to the following inequality: 
     edPrDuoMonoDuo CSCSCSCS  
    DuoEedPrEDuoEDuoIDuoEMonoI  . (7)
                                                          
7  In fact, the complete rule says that the “optimal penalty should equal the net harm to persons other than the 
offender, adjusted upward if the probability of apprehension and conviction is less than one”. This second 
part of the rule becomes relevant in an assessment of optimal enforcement in an imperfect world; see 
Connor and Lande (2006) and Lande (2004).  
8  An alternative definition of harm could be the cost that the violation has imposed on society. That would 
ignore the distributive effects of a predation strategy (namely, the lower consumer surplus due to higher 
monopoly profits) and would only focus on the net welfare losses. It can be shown (e.g., with the model 
and market specification defined below) that such an alternative definition of harm typically cannot reach a 
deterrence effect, as the gains of the violation are typically larger than the optimal harm-based fine. Only if 
the entrant has a large efficiency advantage would such a definition of harm-based fine lead to a deterrence 
effect. 
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The inequality suggests that for small β and large , an ex post II approach is superior in 
terms of overall welfare to an ex post I approach. Generally, the value of the positive 
differential shows how much the antitrust authority should invest at the maximum in the 
quicker but more expensive ex post I approach to increase overall welfare compared to an ex 
post II approach. 
 
2.3.2.3. Ex ante, per se rule 
Under an ex ante rule approach, the antitrust authority commits itself to a certain entry 
reaction before an incumbent actually decides to predate. If the antitrust authority credibly 
announces ex ante (at point int0t ) that it would, for instance, force the incumbent to keep its 
post-entry price for a certain period even after the entrant left the market, the costs of the 
predation period would rise substantially and recoupment possibilities would decline for the 
incumbent simultaneously. Hence, assuming that such a rule works frictionless, the 
incumbent’s incentives are altered in a way that makes predation unprofitable and therefore 
irrational. Consequently, the consumers cannot enjoy the high consumer surplus during the 
predation phase but instead realise the duopoly consumer surplus from the point of entry to 
the end of the market.9 A comparison of the realised welfare with an ex ante, per se rule and 
an ex post I rule of reason shows (see Annex 5.5 for the proof) that the former is the superior 
choice as long as 
Duo
I
Duo
E
edPr
I
edPr
E
edPrDuo CSCS  . (8)
The inequality basically says that an ex ante per rule is superior to an ex post I rule of reason 
as long as the difference between the consumer surplus in duopoly and predation (in the 
predation period) is larger than the overall producer surplus difference between predation and 
duopoly (in the predation period).      
3. Evaluating enforcement options in a linear duopoly predation model 
The aim of the preceding sections was to derive general inequalities which allow a pair-wise 
comparison of different enforcement options in terms of their effects on overall welfare. 
Based on typical effects of increased competition, such as increases in consumer surplus and 
reductions in producer surplus, especially the general welfare differentials of no rule versus 
continuation of monopoly, ex post I rule versus no rule, ex ante rule versus ex post rule and ex 
post I versus ex post II rule were characterised in more detail. Furthermore, general 
expressions for the optimal gain-based and harm-based fines for predation strategies were 
derived.  
Although it was possible to derive certain general propositions about the typical sign of 
certain welfare differentials, others had to remain undetermined. To allow a more detailed and 
sophisticated analysis, the next analytical step must be establishing a link between the derived 
general propositions and a model of competitive interaction. Therefore, in a first step, a linear 
Cournot model with cost differences will be developed to derive the exact general welfare 
differentials in a widely accepted model context (Section 3.1). In a second step, these general 
results will be applied to a particular market specification (i.e., real demand and cost 
functions). In particular, three different scenarios will be constructed which differ in the 
assumptions about the efficiency of the incumbent and the entrant (Section 3.2). A discussion 
of the results of the simulations for the selected enforcement options is provided in Section 
3.3.    
 
                                                          
9  In the simple set-up provided by Figure 1, the consumers are better off with an ex ante approach than with a 
no rule approach as long as the post-predation period is longer than the predation period.  
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3.1. Model specification and general results 
The basic model setup follows a paper by Normann (1994).10 It basically assumes a quantity-
setting duopoly consisting of an incumbent (former monopoly) firm I and an entrant E. The 
inverse demand function is assumed to be linear p=a-b(qI+qE)  with a, b>0. Firms produce at 
constant marginal costs of cI, cE and fixed costs of FCI, FCE. Based on this basic set-up, three 
different market states have to be characterised in terms of its welfare effects: Monopoly, 
duopoly and predation. 
In the monopoly situation, the profit function of the monopolist is given by  
  III FCQcQbQa  . (9)
The incumbent’s profit is maximised by setting the marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, 
leading to the following quantity provided by the monopolist 
b2
ca
Q Im
 . (10)
Substituting the quantity expression into the demand curve leads to the monopoly price 
2
capm  . (11)
Substituting the quantity expression and the price expression in the monopolist’s profit 
function leads to the monopoly profit 
 
b4
ca 2m  . (12)
Finally, the consumer surplus can be derived as  
   
b8
ca
2
QpaCS
2
i
mm
Mono  . (13)
 
In the duopoly situation, the profit functions of the incumbent and the entrant are given by 
   IIIEII FCqcqqba  , (14)
   EEEEIE FCqcqqba  . (15)
Both firms maximise their profit functions by choosing their quantity q under the assumption 
that the quantity of the rival is fixed. The non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium – which 
serves as a benchmark for procompetitive, non-predatory behaviour – is determined by the 
interaction point of the two reaction functions in which the equilibrium quantities for I and E 
are given by 
b3
cc2a
q EICI
 , (16)
b3
cc2a
q IECE
  (17)
leading to an equilibrium price of   
3
cca
p EIC
 . (18)
 
 
                                                          
10  Although the basic model was developed by Normann (in an unpublished paper), the set-up of the basic 
model largely follows Phlips (1995: 241ff.). Phlips applies Normann’s model.  
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Firm profits in the equilibrium are 
 
I
2
EIC
I FCb9
cc2a  . (19)
 
E
2
IEC
E FCb9
cc2a  . (20)
Finally, the consumer surplus realised in the duopoly state can be calculated to  




 






 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
aCS EIEIDuo 





 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE . (21)
 
The predation situation is modelled by assuming that the predator sells a quantity such that 
the entrant makes zero profits. Given the predators sales PIq  the entrant produces  
b2
cbqaq E
P
IP
E
  (22)
as an optimal response. The entrant’s profit function can be rewritten as  
  0FC
b
1
2
cbqaq E
2
E
P
IP
I
P
E 





  . (23)
Solving this for PIq  leads to the following outcomes 
b/FC2
b
ca
q EE
P
I  , (24)
b/FCq E
P
E  , (25)
EE
P cbFCp  . (26)
The incumbent’s profit in the predation period is given by 
  IIpPIPI FCcpq  . (27)
Using the derived expressions for the equilibrium price and quantity for the incumbent leads 
to  
   IIEEEEPI FCccbFCb/FC2bca   . (28)
The profits of the entrant are (by model construction) given by 
0PE  . (29)
Finally, the consumer surplus realised under predation can be calculated to  
      bFCcbFCaCS EEEedPr   21bFC2bca EE . (30)
After specifying the welfare components for the three different market states (which are 
summed up in the following Table 1), the model specification can be applied to the different 
general enforcement options. The results are presented in Table 2. As the expressions in Table 
2 are difficult to interpret, the following section applies a certain market specification in the 
form of certain demand and cost functions to allow an easier interpretation of the theoretical 
results. 
 
 Table 1: Isolating the welfare effects of predation 
 Incumbent’s profits Entrant’s profits Consumer surplus 
Monopoly  
 
I
2
I FC
b4
ca   
 
0  
b8
ca 2I  
Duopoly 
 
I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a     E2IE FCb9
cc2a   
 

 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
ccaa EIEI  





 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE  
Predation   


  bFC2
b
ca
E
E  
   IIEE FCccbFC   
 
0 
 
      bFCcbFCa EEE  





 
2
1bFC2
b
ca
E
E  
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Table 2: Predation enforcement options 
(1) Predation as a 
rational 
business 
strategy 
 






  I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a 



  bFC2
b
ca
E
E    FCccbFC IEE  < 
 






  I
2
I FC
b4
ca  






  I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a  
(2) Net welfare 
increase 
compared to 
monopoly 
     bFCcbFCa EEE   21bFC2bca EE  b8ca
2
I > 
 



  FC
b4
ca 2I 
 

  bFC2
b
ca
E
E    IIEE FCccbFC   
(3) Predation 
unsuccessful 
(ex post I rule) 
compared to 
successful 
predation (no 
rule) 


 
 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
a EIEI 








 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE  
b8
ca 2I > 
 



  I
2
I FC
b4
ca  



  I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a  



  E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a  
(4) Gain-based 
fine 
 






  I
2
I FC
b4
ca   






  I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a  




 

  bFC2
b
ca
E
E    IIEE FCccbFC    




  I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a  
(5) Harm-based 
fine 

 
 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
a EIEI 




 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE      bFCcbFCa EEE  





 
2
1bFC2
b
ca
E
E   

 E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a


 
 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
a EIEI  
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




 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE   
b8
ca 2I  


 E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a  
(6) Ex post I 
versus  
ex post II 
 

 
 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
a EIEI 




 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE -   


b8
ca 2I  


 



 






 
b3
cc2a
3
cca
a EIEI 




 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE -      bFCcbFCa EEE 








 
2
1bFC2
b
ca
E
E  


  I
2
I FC
b4
ca - 
 
E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a  -   

 I
2
EI FC
b9
cc2a     


  E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a  
(7) Ex ante vs.  
ex post I 

 

 



 

 
b3
cc2a
3
ccaa EIEI 




 
2
1
b3
cc2a IE      bFCcbFCa EEE  








 
2
1bFC2
b
ca
E
E > 

  bFC2
b
ca
E
E    IIEE FCccbFC   
 
E
2
IE FC
b9
cc2a    I2EI FCb9
cc2a   
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3.2. Market specification and applied results 
Given the derivation of the general results in the preceding section, this section will specify 
the market under investigation and therefore allows the derivation of applied results. To be as 
specific as possible, it is assumed that market demand is given by Q=1,000-1,000p (which is 
equivalent to an inverse demand function of p=1-0.001(q1+q2)). The marginal costs of the 
incumbent are fixed to cI=0.28. However, the entrant’s marginal costs are subject to change. 
In scenario 1, the entrant is equally efficient and therefore has constant marginal costs of 
cE=0.28. In scenario 2, the entrant has marginal costs of cE=0.21 and therefore a moderate 
cost advantage over the incumbent. In scenario 3, the entrant has a large cost advantage 
leading to constant marginal costs of cE=0.14. With respect to fixed cost, two different states 
are differentiated in all three scenarios: FCI=FCE=0 and FCI=FCE=10. Finally, within every 
entry scenario, four different lengths of the post-predation period () are assumed: while  is 
fixed to =5,  has the four specifications =5, =7, =10 and =15. These scenario 
specifications are summed up in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Scenario specifications 
  
Marginal costs 
(Incumbent) 
Marginal costs 
(Entrant) 
Fixed costs 
(Incumbent 
and entrant) 
Predation 
periods α 
Post-predation 
periods β 
Scenario 1 0.28 0.28 0; 10 5 5; 7; 10; 15 
Scenario 2 0.28 0.21 0; 10 5 5; 7; 10; 15 
Scenario 3 0.28 0.14 0; 10 5 5; 7; 10; 15 
 
In the following, the three scenarios are first characterised through an initial welfare 
assessment in Section 3.2.1, followed by an assessment of market prices in Section 3.2.2. The 
evaluation of selected predation enforcement options is subsequently provided in Section 
3.2.3.   
3.2.1. Initial welfare assessment 
Given the market and scenario specifications, it is possible first to calculate consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and overall welfare of the three possible market states: monopoly, duopoly 
and predation. The following Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the results for the three scenarios.11 In 
scenario 1, the monopolistic producer realises a relatively high profit while the consumers get 
a relatively small consumer surplus. In the duopoly situation, the consumer surplus increases 
significantly while overall producer surplus drops and is equally shared between the 
incumbent and the entrant. In the predation situation, the entrant (by construction) and the 
incumbent make zero profits. The consumer surplus is relatively high and equal to the overall 
welfare.12 The introduction of fixed costs does not change the picture much. In the monopoly 
situation, the consumer surplus is the same while the producer surplus is reduced by the 
amount of fixed costs. The same is basically true for the duopoly situation. In the predation 
state, the incumbent is able to drive down the entrant’s profits to zero and still realises a small 
positive profit. Total welfare is still substantially higher than in the duopoly case, but it is 
smaller than in the case without fixed costs.   
   
                                                          
11  The overall welfare is represented by the positive height of the boxes; if the producer surplus is negative, it 
has been subtracted from the consumer surplus for presentational purposes. 
12  In fact, it can be shown that the consumer surplus is equal to the surplus realised under perfect competition. 
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Figure 2: Welfare components if entrant has no cost advantage (Scenario 1) 
 
In scenario 2, the monopoly situation remains unchanged compared to scenario 1. In the 
duopoly situation without fixed costs, the cost advantage of the entrant leads to a higher 
duopoly total welfare, slightly higher consumer surplus and producer surplus. As the entrant 
has an efficiency advantage over the incumbent, it now gets a larger share of the producer 
surplus. In the predation period, the incumbent now has to accept losses in order to drive 
down the entrant’s profits to zero. While the consumer surplus is unchanged, compared to 
scenario 1, overall welfare drops by the amount of the negative producer surplus. Considering 
fixed costs basically has the same effects as described above. Monopoly and duopoly profits 
decline by the amount of the fixed cost, which directly feeds into a loss in overall welfare. In 
the predation situation, the incumbent can drive down the profit of the entrant to zero and still 
realises a small but positive producer surplus.    
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Figure 3: Welfare components if entrant has moderate cost advantage (Scenario 2) 
 
In scenario 3, the monopolist situation remains unchanged. The effects in the duopoly and 
predation situation are the same as described in scenario 2, but the effects are more distinctive 
due to the larger efficiency advantage of the entrant. Overall welfare in the duopoly and 
predation situations increases moderately. In the predation situation, the incumbent realises an 
even larger negative producer surplus, which leads to a reduction in welfare of the same size. 
Even in the state with positive fixed costs, the incumbent is still realising negative profits in 
the predation state. 
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Figure 4: Welfare components if entrant has large cost advantage (Scenario 3) 
 
3.2.2.  Analysis of market prices  
In addition to an analysis of the welfare components for the different scenarios, a look at the 
resulting market prices predicted by the model is insightful. These prices are depicted for the 
different market states in Table 4. As explained above, the marginal costs of the incumbent 
are always given by 0.28, while the entrant can have no, a moderate or a large cost advantage.  
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Table 4: Market prices for the different market structures 
 
Cost  
Advantage FC=0 FC=10 FC=20 
Monopoly  0.64 0.64 0.64 
     
Duopoly No 0.52 0.52 0.52 
 Moderate 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 Large 0.47 0.47 0.47 
     
Predation No 0.28 0.38 0.42 
 Moderate 0.21 0.31 0.35 
 Large 0.14 0.24 0.28 
 
As Table 4 shows, the incumbent does not always have to drop prices below its own marginal 
costs to force the entrant out of the market. In the case of equal marginal costs, the 
incumbent’s prices are always at or above its marginal costs. If the entrant has a moderate cost 
advantage, the incumbent’s prices are below its own marginal costs in a world without fixed 
costs; however, as the table shows, in a world of FC=10, the incumbent can still predate with 
a price above its own marginal cost. If the entrant has a large cost advantage, the incumbent 
has to accept prices below its marginal costs even in a world of FC=10. However, if FC=20 
he can force the exit of the entrant with prices at his own marginal costs.13 These theoretically 
derived market prices which are sufficient to drive the entrant out of the market illustrate the 
fuzziness and consequently weak performance of any application of the Areeda-Turner rule in 
detecting predation. 
3.2.3. Assessment of predation enforcement options 
Following the set-up and characterisation of the basic model of competitive interaction, the 
next step is to connect these results to the general enforcement options derived above. In the 
following, a perfect world is assumed, i.e. antitrust enforcement is costless and the antitrust 
authority acts faultlessly. It is then possible to quantify the following conditions for the 
chosen market specification (see Table 2 for the general derivations):  
1. Predation as a rational business strategy (i.e. it must be profitable for the incumbent), 
2. Welfare increases if predation is successful (compared to a continuation of monopoly), 
3. Welfare increases if predation is unsuccessful (compared to a successful predation attempt) 
or – alternatively – whether an ex post I rule leads to a welfare increase compared to a no 
rule approach, 
4. Level of an optimal gain-based fine (including the percentage value of the monopoly profit 
in the preceding year), 
5. Level of an optimal harm-based fine (including the percentage value of the monopoly profit 
in the preceding year), 
6. Ex post I enforcement leads to higher welfare than ex post II enforcement, 
7. Ex ante enforcement leads to a higher welfare than ex post I enforcement. 
 
                                                          
13  For FC=0, the incumbent has to match the marginal costs of the entrant to reach its exit. Overall, the table 
in combination with the welfare components analysis above reflects the well-known theoretical result that 
low prices are necessarily good for consumers as they increase consumer welfare, but are not necessarily 
good for overall welfare. In the model and market specification used above, the incumbent has to accept 
prices below its own marginal costs on three occasions to reach the exit of the entrant: FC=0 / moderate, 
FC=0 / large and FC=10 / large. While consumer welfare always increases in the predation situation, 
compared to the duopoly situation, total welfare is slightly higher in the FC=0 / moderate scenario and 
clearly smaller in the remaining two worlds with a large cost advantage. 
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The quantitative results for all seven conditions can be found in Table 5. The derivation of the 
delta values for the various options can be exemplified for condition (2). As shown above, 
this condition is met as long as  
 edPrIedPrEMonoIMonoedPr CSCS  . (31)
Rewriting the equation leads to  
0CSCS edPrI
edPr
E
Mono
I
MonoedPr  . (32)
or short >0. This delta value is presented in Table 5 (multiplied by the relevant number of 
periods α and β). The deltas for the other conditions are derived in the same way. 
In the first column of Table 5, it is specified whether predation is a rational business 
strategy for the given market specification. As it was argued above, the profits in the post-
predation period must be higher than the losses in the predation period to make predation a 
rational strategy. Formally, the condition can be expressed as follows:  
   DuoMonoedPrDuo  . (33)
The values in the first column in Table 5 show that if the entrant has the same marginal 
costs as the incumbent, predation is always a rational strategy for the incumbent. This is true 
even for the case that the post-predation period ‘only’ has the same length as the predation 
period. However, if the entrant has a moderate cost advantage, predation becomes an 
irrational strategy if ==5 (indicating that it is profit-maximising for the incumbent to 
accommodate), but remains rational for =7, 10 and 15. Finally, if the entrant has a large cost 
advantage, predation becomes irrational for , =5 and 7 but stays rational for =10 and 15. It 
can be concluded that the more efficient the entrant, the larger the post-predation period must 
be in order to make predation a rational strategy. Furthermore, the existence of fixed costs 
generally makes the use of predation a more successful strategy for the incumbent.  
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Table 5. Delta values for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
  Δ<0 Δ>0 Δ>0 Δ>0 Δ>0 Δ>0 Δ>0  
Scenario 1-Same 
marginal cost                 
a=5, b=5                 
No fixed cost -72.0 324.0 180.0 72.0 108.0 72.0 -144.0 4% 
10 per firm -332.0 249.0 130.0 332.0 343.0 -213.0 -119.0 12% 
a=5, b=7         
No fixed cost -216.0 324.0 252.0 216.0 324.0 144.0 -144.0 12% 
10 per firm -476.0 249.0 182.0 476.0 539.0 -161.0 -119.0 19% 
a=5, b=10         
No fixed cost -432.0 324.0 360.0 432.0 648.0 252.0 -144.0 23% 
10 per firm -692.0 249.0 260.0 692.0 833.0 -83.0 -119.0 30% 
a=5, b=15         
No fixed cost -792.0 324.0 540.0 792.0 1188.0 432.0 -144.0 43% 
10 per firm -1052.0 249.0 390.0 1052.0 1323.0 47.0 -119.0 48% 
Scenario 2-Entrant 
has moderate cost 
advantage                 
a=5, b=5         
No fixed cost 97.9 311.8 302.8 -97.9 196.0 106.9 -8.9 7% 
10 per firm -267.1 306.8 252.8 267.1 466.0 -213.0 -54.0 17% 
a=5, b=7         
No fixed cost -67.4 311.8 423.9 67.4 482.4 228.0 -8.9 17% 
10 per firm -432.4 306.8 353.9 432.4 732.4 -112.0 -54.0 26% 
a=5, b=10         
No fixed cost -315.4 311.8 605.6 315.4 912.1 409.7 -8.9 33% 
10 per firm -680.4 306.8 505.6 680.4 1132.1 39.7 -54.0 41% 
a=5, b=15         
No fixed cost -728.7 311.8 908.4 728.7 1628.2 712.5 -8.9 59% 
10 per firm -1093.7 306.8 758.4 1093.7 1798.2 292.5 -54.0 65% 
Scenario 3-Entrant 
has large cost 
advantage                 
a=5, b=5         
No fixed cost 327.7 275.0 463.9 -327.7 325.1 138.8 188.9 12% 
10 per firm -142.3 340.0 413.9 142.3 630.1 -216.2 73.9 23% 
a=5, b=7         
No fixed cost 143.2 275.0 649.5 -143.2 695.1 324.4 188.9 25% 
10 per firm -326.8 340.0 579.5 326.8 980.1 -50.6 73.9 35% 
a=5, b=10         
No fixed cost -133.5 275.0 927.8 133.5 1250.2 602.7 188.9 45% 
10 per firm -603.5 340.0 827.8 603.5 1505.2 197.7 73.9 54% 
a=5, b=15         
No fixed cost -594.6 275.0 1391.7 594.6 2175.2 1066.6 188.9 79% 
10 per firm -1064.6 340.0 1241.7 1064.6 2380.2 611.6 73.9 86% 
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In the second column, it is tested whether a successful predation attempt leads to a net welfare 
increase compared to a continuation of monopoly. As Table 5 shows, this is the case in every 
scenario and every specification of β. The economic reason behind this finding is basically 
that the gain in consumer surplus in the predation period is higher than the corresponding 
losses in producer surplus.  
In the third column, it is tested whether making predation unsuccessful increases welfare 
compared to a situation in which predation is successful. Formally, this is equal to the 
question if an ex post I rule outperforms a no rule approach. As the table shows, this is the 
case in every scenario. In other words, optimal antitrust enforcement has the potential to 
increase welfare in every scenario under the chosen model and market specification. 
In the fourth column, the optimal gain-based fine is calculated. The fine is always positive 
except for the cases in which predation is an irrational strategy for the incumbent. The fine 
increases with  (as the gain increases with ). The existence of fixed cost – ceteris paribus – 
generally leads to a significant increase in the size of the optimal gain-based fine.  
In the fifth column, the optimal harm-based fine is calculated. All values show positive 
fines indicating that predation is harmful in any case analysed.14 The harm-based fine is 
always larger than the corresponding gain-based fine. Furthermore, the harm-based fine 
increases with the efficiency of the entrant, indicating that the loss of a more efficient firm 
due to predation harms society more than the loss of an equally efficient firm.   
In the sixth column, it is tested whether the switch from an ex post II rule (with an optimal 
harm-based fine after ε=5 post-predation enforcement periods) to an ex post I rule can lead to 
a welfare improvement. In general, the results show that as long as the fixed costs are equal to 
zero, it is always welfare-improving to trade an ex post I approach for an ex post II approach. 
The size of the welfare improvement rises with β and the efficiency of the entrant. This can be 
explained by the fact that ε=5 and that the period of monopoly after punishment (β-ε) 
increases, causing harm to society. The harm to society is increasing with the efficiency of the 
vanished entrant. If fixed costs of 10 are necessary to enter the market, it is often better to stay 
with an ex post II approach. As column six shows, if the entrant has the same efficiency, the 
welfare differential is negative for β=5; 7; 10. If the entrant is more efficient than the 
incumbent, the welfare differential remains negative for β=5; 7, indicating that it is welfare-
improving to stay with an ex post II approach.  
In the seventh column, it is tested whether an ex ante enforcement rule outperforms an ex 
post enforcement rule. As the column shows, this is not the case for scenarios 1 and 2. 
However, if the entrant has a large cost advantage, an ex ante rule indeed outperforms an ex 
post rule. This is basically because under an ex post regime, the producer surplus losses 
incurred by the predation strategy of the (inefficient) incumbent are bigger than the additional 
consumer surplus created in the predation period.         
In the last column, the percentage shares of the harm-based fines with respect to the 
monopoly turnover in the preceding business year are calculated.15 Compared to the maximum 
possible fine in the EU of 10% of the (worldwide) turnover, the percentages appear relatively 
high, especially for large beta values and the ‘more efficient entrant’ scenarios. This gives an 
indication that the largest fines possible in the European Union are unlikely to reach a full 
deterrence effect or can compensate for the harm caused by a predation strategy.   
Based on the spreadsheet calculations undertaken to derive the pair-wise welfare 
comparisons shown in Table 5, it is further possible to characterise the welfare consequences 
                                                          
14  However, it is possible to show that the optimal harm-based fine turns negative for large α and small β. 
This basically reflects the fact that the incumbent invests a relatively large amount during the predation 
period α and does not have the chance to realise a positive return on investment in the short post-predation 
period β. 
15  The monopoly turnover is 2764.8.  
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of selected iterative changes in the enforcement options graphically. This is done in Figures 5 
and 6. Both figures include four charts depicting:   
 
1. Welfare change due to switch from no rule to ex post I rule, 
2. Welfare change due to switch from ex post II to ex post I, 
3. Welfare change due to switch from ex post I to ex ante, 
4. Aggregated welfare change due to predation enforcement. 
 
Both figures differentiate only with respect to the underlying number of post-predation 
periods. While the charts in Figure 5 are based on β=7, Figure 6 assumes β=15. In line with 
the findings in Table 5, it is shown that a switch from a no rule approach to an ex post I 
approach is always welfare-increasing, irrespective of the underlying β-value (although the 
welfare change as well as the efficiency of the entrant increases in β).  
In the case of a switch from ex post II to ex post I – depicted in the second chart in Figure 5 
– it is shown that β now becomes decisive with respect to the sign of the change in welfare. If 
β is sufficiently small, the welfare change is negative (as shown for the case of β=7); 
otherwise it is positive (as shown for the case β=15). Furthermore, the charts in Figures 5 and 
6 reveal that the welfare loss/gain is decreasing or increasing with the efficiency of the 
entrant, respectively.   
If there is a switch from an ex post I to an ex ante approach, the figures show that the 
results do not depend on β. As explained above, such a switch in the enforcement option is 
only desirable from a total welfare perspective as long as the efficiency advantage is 
substantial (and the losses of the predator are correspondingly large).  
Finally, Chart 4 in Figures 5 and 6 shows the aggregate welfare change due to predation 
enforcement. A comparison of both charts reveals that a no rule approach in both cases 
realises the lowest welfare change due to predation enforcement. In terms of the other 
enforcement options, the picture is more diverse. For the case of β=7, it is shown that an ex 
post II approach is welfare-maximising if the incumbent and the entrant have the same 
marginal costs. This result holds for the case of a moderate cost advantage on the side of the 
entrant. If, however, the entrant has a large efficiency advantage, it is shown that an ex ante 
approach would realise the largest increase in welfare.  
The pattern just described for β=7 changes significantly if β=15 is assumed. Now an ex 
post I approach would maximise welfare in a world in which incumbent and entrant are 
equally efficient. The same conclusion holds for a moderate cost advantage on the side of the 
entrant. If, however, the entrant has a large efficiency advantage, an ex ante approach again 
becomes the welfare-maximising enforcement option. It is further worth remarking that the 
performance of an ex post II approach deteriorates significantly with the increase in β. While 
in the β=7 world, all three active enforcement options realise comparable levels of welfare 
increase, the β=15 world shows that only the ex post I and ex ante approaches are still 
comparable with respect to their respective welfare improvements.  
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Figure 5: Welfare changes and aggregated welfare change for different enforcement options (α=5, β=7) 
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Figure 6: Welfare changes and aggregated welfare change for different enforcement options (α=5, β=15) 
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4. Summary and conclusion 
The major interest of antitrust law and economics with respect to predation strategies has been 
largely twofold. On the one hand, there has been a lively discussion on the question whether 
predation can be a rational strategy for an incumbent facing an entry threat. On the other 
hand, research has focused on the problem of how an antitrust authority could and should 
detect predation strategies and, especially how it could distinguish such abuses from socially 
desirable procompetitive behaviour. The aim of this paper was to think beyond these two 
standard stages of rationality and detection and to focus on a third one in the antitrust analysis 
of predation: intervention. This stage acknowledges the necessity of appropriate detection 
rules for efficient predation enforcement but goes beyond these insights, using them as input 
for determining how these rules should be linked to interventions against predation strategies.  
 Against this background, the paper commenced with a brief characterisation of the 
building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluated 
selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating 
between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, Table 6 
summarises the key results of the analysis.  
Table 6: Results of an evaluation of predation enforcement options 
Enforcement 
Option 
Key simulation results 
No rule  Superior to a simple continuation of monopoly, as consumers typically gain more in 
the predation period than producers lose (in terms of surplus) 
 Inferior to any kind of antitrust enforcement ( in a perfect world)  
 Only exceptions are cases in which entry is socially inefficient (such as in a natural 
monopoly or during patent protection to secure innovation incentives) 
Ex post rule of 
reason 
 Differentiates between ex post I enforcement (while entrant is in the market) and ex 
post II enforcement (entrant had to leave the market) 
 Ex post I approach is typically superior to a no rule approach 
 In an ex post I approach the antitrust authority has to terminate the infringement 
(restoring competition) but should not impose a fine, as the incumbent has already 
fined itself by investing in a predation strategy without any positive payoff 
 An ex post I approach always dominates an ex post II approach in a world without 
fixed costs. In a world with fixed costs, the ex post I approach is more likely to be 
superior to an ex post II approach the longer the post-predation period and the more 
efficient the entrant is 
  An ex post II approach uses fines to take away the gain of the predation strategy or 
alternatively to compensate for the harm the predation strategy caused to others 
 In an ex post II approach, the antitrust authority does not have to end the 
infringement but has to impose a fine which should be a function of the length of the 
predation period, the length of the post-predation period and the efficiency of the 
entrant 
 Harm-based fines are found to have certain advantages over gain-based fines; 
typically, harm-based fines are larger than gain-based fines, indicating that a 
deterrence effect is always reached with optimal harm-based fines 
 Possible fine levels in the EU are unlikely to have a deterrence effect 
Ex ante, per se rule  Inferior to an ex post I approach if the entrant is as efficient as the incumbent or 
only has a moderate efficiency advantage 
 Superior to an ex post I approach if the entrant is very efficient and the incumbent 
correspondingly makes huge losses while driving the entrant out of the market. An 
ex ante approach would avoid these huge losses 
 
Given the framework developed and analysis provided in this paper, a number of possible 
extension promise to add value. In addition to possible changes in the model or market 
specifications, especially the introduction of uncertainty and limited information can be 
expected to significantly alter the results. One key issue in this respect would be the 
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consideration of the possibility of antitrust errors by the antitrust authority. Another issue 
which could be incorporated easily into the general framework are enforcement costs (which 
can be expected to differ significantly between the different enforcement options). Other 
possible extensions include the discounting of future profits or the consideration of further 
evaluation factors such as inter-industry robustness or the risk of regulatory capture.   
In terms of important policy conclusions, the relevance of the above analysis can be 
separated into two channels: the refinement of the current predation enforcement regime and 
its amendment. While the former channel focuses on an increased role of interventions 
(especially fines) within the existing predation enforcement regime (which is applicable for 
all industries in an economy), the latter proposes the implementation of an additional 
enforcement approach for specific industries in which predation can be expected to be more 
likely and more harmful than in other industries.  
With respect to the refinement of the current enforcement regime, the basic conclusion 
from the above analysis is that the current fine levels might be too weak to deter predation. 
However, a proposal to simply increase the fines for detected and convicted predators alone 
might be too weak to significantly amplify the deterrence effect, basically due to the very low 
probability of conviction. As a consequence, it might be worthwhile to consider the 
amendment of the current predation enforcement regime by the introduction of a pre-
screening approach which aims at identifying industries in which entry is difficult but 
desirable and a predation strategy might be a suitable instrument for an incumbent to fight 
such occasional entry attempts. In those industries, it makes sense to replace the ex post rule 
of reason approach with an ex ante per se rule approach as the latter keeps the entrant in the 
market and therefore preserves competition. Such an approach is likely to maximise the 
deterrent effect of predation enforcement without jeopardising the incentives of incumbents to 
implement procompetitive price reductions.    
5. Annex 
5.1. Proof of Inequality (1) 
As discussed above, an initial welfare assessment has to compare the welfare situation of a 
successful predation strategy against the welfare realised if the monopoly situation in the pre-
predation period would have continued. Based on the setup shown in Figure 1, the welfare if 
predation is successful,   
        MonoexitendedPrentryexitsuccessfuledationPr CSttCSttW  
    edPrEentryexit tt       MonoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  , (34)
has to be larger than the welfare realised in the case of continuous monopoly, 
        MonoexitendMonoentryexitMonopolyContinuous CSttCSttW  
       MonoIexitendMonoIentryexit tttt  . (35)
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
 MonoIMonoMonopolyContinuous CSW   (36)
 edPrIedPrEedPrsuccessfuledationPr CSW  . (37)
Further simplifying and rearranging leads to                 
 edPrIedPrEMonoIMonoedPr CSCS  . (38)
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5.2. Proof of Inequality (2) 
As discussed above, antitrust rules and interventions increase welfare as long as the overall 
welfare realised with such interventions,        )CS)(tt(CSttW DuoexitendedPrentryexitAntitrust  
       DuoEexitendedPrEentryexit tttt  
      DuoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  , 
(39)
is larger than the welfare realised when the incumbent can successfully apply a predation 
strategy         MonoexitendedPrentryexitAntitrustNo CSttCSttW  
    edPrEentryexit tt       MonoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  . (40)
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
 MonoIMonoAntitrustNo CSW  , (41)
 DuoIDuoEDuoAntitrust CSW  . (42)
Further simplifying and rearranging leads to                 
 DuoIDuoEMonoIMonoDuo CSCS  . (43)
5.3. Proof of Equalities (3) and (4) 
As discussed above, optimal fines can be calculated on a gain-basis and on a harm-basis. In 
the following, proofs for both fines are provided.  
 
Optimal gain-based fine 
The optimal gain-based fine for an antitrust violation is equal to the additional gain the 
offender realises due to its misbehaviour. In the setup of Figure 1, the optimal fine is therefore 
defined as the difference between the incumbent’s overall profits realised under successful 
predation  
       MonoIexitendedPrIentryexitedPrI tttt   (44)
and the incumbent’s profit if it accommodates the entrant 
       DuoIexitemdDuoIentryexitDuoI tttt  . (45)
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
edPr
I
Mono
I
edPr
I  , (46)
Duo
I
Duo
I
Duo
I  . (47)
Generally, the optimal gain-based fine is DuoIedPrIbasedGainF  . Using the expressions above 
leads to the following optimal gain-based fine: 
   DuoIedPrIDuoIMonoIbasedGainF  . (48)
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Optimal harm-based fine 
As explained in the text, the optimal harm-based fine refers to the ‘net harm to others’ caused 
by the violation. In the predation period, harm is therefore given by the sum of the difference 
between the duopoly and the predation consumer surpluses and the difference between the 
entrant’s duopoly and predation profits 
    edPrEDuoEedPrDuo CSCSHarm  . (49)
If predation is successful, the net harm to others is given by the difference between the 
duopoly and the monopoly consumer surpluses and the entrant’s duopoly profits (it would 
have earned without a successful predation strategy) 
  DuoEMonoDuo CSCSHarm  . (50)
The optimal harm-based fine is therefore given by 
       DuoEMonoDuoedPrEDuoEedPrDuobasedHarm CSCSCSCSF   (51)
 
An alternative definition of harm could be the cost that the violation has imposed on society. 
Such harm would ignore the distributive effects of a predation strategy (namely, the lower 
consumer surplus due to higher monopoly profits) and would only focus on the net welfare 
losses, which can be defined as the difference between the welfare level which would have 
been realised if the incumbent has accommodated the entrant 
            DuoEentryexitDuoexitendDuoentryexitedAccommodat ttCSttCSttW  
           DuoIexitendDuoIentryexitDuoEexitend tttttt  , (52)
and the welfare level which would have been realised if the incumbent has successfully 
applied a predation strategy   
    edPrEentryexit tt       MonoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  . (53)
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
  DuoIDuoEDuoedAccommodat CSW  , (54)
   MonoIMonoedPrIedPrEedPrsuccessfuledationPr CSCSW  . (55)
The optimal harm-based fine would then be given by 
   DuoIDuoEDuobasedHarm CSF  
    MonoIMonoedPrIedPrEedPr CSCS  . 
 
(56)
It can be shown (e.g., with the model and market specification used above) that such an 
alternative definition of harm typically cannot reach a deterrence effect, as the gains of the 
violation are typically greater than the ‘optimal’ harm-based fine. Only if the entrant has a 
large efficiency advantage would this definition of a harm-based fine lead to a deterrence 
effect.    
5.4. Proof of Inequality (6)  
The choice between an ex post I approach and an ex post II approach with an optimal fine can 
be expressed as follows. In an ex post I approach the overall welfare is given by  
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    )CS)(tt(CSttW DuoexitendedPrentryexitIpostEx  
       DuoEexitendedPrEentryexit tttt  
      DuoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  . 
(57)
As shown above, the optimal fine is 0 in an ex post I approach, as the predator did not cause 
any harm. The overall welfare in an ex post II approach with an optimal fine is given by 
        MonoexitendedPrentryexitIIpostEx CSttCSttW      edPrEentryexit tt        MonoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt         DuoEMonoDuoedPrEDuoEedPrDuo CSCSCSCS  . 
(58)
The welfare realised is just the welfare in an approach where the antitrust authority does not 
intervene and the welfare of collecting the optimal fine after  periods. As the predator 
successfully reached the exit of the entrant, he can still charge monopoly prices for the 
remaining - periods. 
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
 DuoIDuoEDuoIpostEx CSW  , (59)
  MonoIMonoIIpostEx CSW          DuoEMonoDuoedPrEDuoEedPrDuo CSCSCSCS  . (60)
The welfare differential can be calculated by subtracting  IIpostExW  from IpostExW . The value of 
the positive differential shows how much the antitrust authority should invest at the maximum 
in the quicker but more expensive ex post I approach to increase overall welfare compared to 
an ex post II approach.  
5.5. Proof of Inequality (8) 
As discussed above, an alternative to ex post antitrust rules is ex ante antitrust rules. If such 
rules work frictionless they turn predation into an unprofitable strategy before it is actually 
played by the incumbent. Consequently, the entrant will be accommodated under such a 
regime.  
Ex ante rules are superior to ex post rules if the welfare realised under the former regime,        DuoexitendDuoentryexitruleanteEx CSttCSttW  
       DuoEexitendDuoEentryexit tttt  
      DuoIexitendDuoIentryexit tttt  . 
(61)
is larger than the welfare realised under an ex post regime, 
    )CS)(tt(CSttW DuoexitendedPrentryexitrulepostEx  
       DuoEexitendedPrEentryexit tttt  
      DuoIexitendedPrIentryexit tttt  . 
(62)
Substituting    enrtyexit tt  and    exitend tt  and simplifying both expressions leads to 
 DuoIDuoEDuoruleanteEx CSW  , (63)
 edPrIedPrEedPrrulepostEx CSW  . (64)
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Further simplifying and rearranging leads to  
Duo
I
Duo
E
edPr
I
edPr
E
edPrDuo CSCS  . (65)
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